Dr. Nasser Muhammad Ali Al-Taweel
Professor of Political Science, Sanaa University
Nasseraltawill4@gmail.com
Abstract:
The Islah Party in Yemen holds a significant role in the ongoing conflict that has persisted since March 26, 2015. Regarded as a key player, some view Islah as the second major force in the complex war, possessing a notable capacity to shape the trajectories of both conflict and resolution. Much like other political entities in Yemen, Islah’s stance on the war and potential peace negotiations with the Houthi group is influenced by a range of fears and concerns that demand careful consideration and constructive engagement.
This study employs an open-ended questionnaire methodology, distributed through the Google Drive application, targeting a deliberate sample of Islah members. The survey takes into account various variables such as organizational level, age, geographical affiliation, and ideological orientation. The aim is to illuminate the overarching concerns steering Islah’s position on settlement and peace with the Houthis. Additionally, in-depth interviews with several Islah leaders, conducted by a researcher specializing in this party and well-versed in its positions, contribute to a nuanced understanding of the perceptions guiding the party’s approach to settlement and peace with the Houthi group.
The study extends its reach beyond Islah by involving individuals outside the party to ascertain whether these concerns are exclusive to Islah or resonate within a broader segment of Yemeni society. Ultimately, the overarching objective of this paper is to provide insights that can guide policymakers and both international and local peace mediators. By shedding light on the intricacies of Islah’s reservations and their impact on the party’s stance toward political settlement and peace with the Houthis, the study aims to contribute valuable considerations to navigate the existing military and political balances in the Yemeni conflict.
Why the Islah Party?
The need to examine the mutual fears between the main Yemeni parties towards each other is emphasized, because those fears – whether real or imagined – have a significant impact on their behavior, and thus on the course of the conflict and the possibility of settlement and peace. This paper addresses some of those concerns, but from the vision of the “Yemeni Gathering for Reform” (we will call it “Islah” for short) towards the Houthi “Ansar Allah” (we will call them later the Houthis). The truth is that Islah cannot be viewed and dealt with about its position on the Houthis as a political party only, as it must be seen as a large entity located at the heart of a flexible and diverse network of allies, whose vision intersects partially or completely towards opposing what they describe as the “Houthi rebellion” can influence it, and it includes religious groups, intellectual trends, geographical components, and social and political forces.
Islah lies at the heart of a broad trend of citizens who are wary of the Houthis’ efforts to impose their sectarian perceptions of power and governance. This movement includes the majority of individuals living in areas historically affiliated with the Shafi’i school of thought, and it also includes citizens in various regions of Yemen who were influenced by the religious ideas produced by the Islamic awakening in the region during the past five decades and hundreds of thousands of people who expatriated in Saudi Arabia and were affected by the prevailing pattern of religiosity there. More importantly, graduates of public schools and universities who received religious concepts and perceptions included in the educational curricula. These concepts focus on what is common between Islamic sects and schools, and they played a decisive role in overcoming historical sectarian divisions. These curricula were undeclared supervised by the Islamic Movement, which has the greatest influence in the education sector in northern Yemen, and which represented the first phase of the “Islah” party.
Geopolitically, “Islah” is often viewed as a pivotal force in the central and south-central regions of Yemen, counteracting what Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani characterizes as the influence of northern Zaydi tribal elites1. However, its impact transcends this narrative, extending across the entire landscape of Yemen, including the Saada Governorate—a historical bastion of sectarian and scholarly beliefs in the imamate and guardianship. Notably, Islah has established a significant presence in areas north of Sana’a, historically aligned with the Zaidi Imams’ regime.
The party’s influence has disrupted the traditional geographic division of Yemen along sectarian lines, erasing the demarcation between Zaidi-dominated northern Yemen and Shafi’i-dominated southern Yemen. Despite facing opposition and criticism, Islah has managed to establish a notable presence in southern governorates, not necessarily claiming to represent them. This dynamic is influenced by mobilization campaigns against Islah, particularly in light of its stance during the 1994 war, and competition from other political entities such as the Salafist movement and factions within the Southern Movement that gained prominence in 2007.
The military intervention by Arab Coalition countries has further reshaped the political and security landscape in these governorates. Following the expulsion of the Houthis from Aden, the United Arab Emirates advocated for the separation of resistance factions, incorporating specific groups from the Salafist movement and aligning them with movement factions into newly formed military entities. Concurrently, efforts were made to empower movement factions in leading local authorities, culminating in the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council on May 4, 2017. This parallel approach aimed at undermining legitimate authority2 is ostensibly motivated by the desire to eliminate the Islah party due to its commitment to national unity.
Since 2016, the Islah party has been a common goal for both the Southern Transitional Council, part of the Madkhali Salafist movement, and the United Arab Emirates, seeking to uproot its influence. “This effort has indeed achieved some successes, but the party’s strong structure helped it survive.”3
Despite challenges, the Islah party has withstood attempts to diminish its influence. Politically, it remains at the core of a broad popular movement advocating for the political values underpinning the republican system established by the September 26, 1962 revolution. These values emphasize equal citizenship, democratic principles, political and party pluralism, and constitutional legitimacy4. The Islah Party perceives the conflict with the Houthis as a challenge to state authorities and a deviation from constitutional legitimacy. This collective movement opposes the Houthi’s political ideology, particularly their attempts to restrict governing authority to specific families.
Islah shares these values with the rest of the political parties but is unique in its ability to root them and market them in religious and popular circles. Since the Houthi group took control of power, the “Islah” party has turned the eyes of many- into a wall to protect what they describe as the republic and its gains, as its positions towards it are characterized by consistency and strictness. This is the same role that was addressed by the political discourse of the General People’s Congress party during the six wars in Saada (2004 – 2010) before it was engulfed in confusion and turmoil due to the alliance of its leader, “Ali Abdullah Saleh,” and subsequently his wing in Sana’a, with the Houthis.
Previous images of Islah are further shaped by its role in opposing what it describes as a coup by the Houthi group. Although other political parties are involved in confronting the Houthis, Islah plays the largest role in them, whether in popular mobilization or media, political, and perhaps military clashes.
Confronting the Houthis is at the top of the Islah Party’s concerns. Despite its political and media clashes – and in some cases militarily – with other political and military parties, or its competition with them, its discourse focuses on the priority of confronting what it calls the Houthi coup, and prioritizing it over everything else. Unlike some other forces that make Islah – or others – a strategic opponent, the Houthis are ranked lower – perhaps – on the list of opponents.
Also, the possibility of the Islahists handing over unilateral rule to the Houthis seems weak, unless it is controlled by a common understanding between them. This is due to Islah’s intense preoccupation with politics and its involvement in public affairs, in one way or another, putting it in a state of conflict with the Houthis’ perception and practices of power. This situation does not apply, of course, to the rest of the political and social parties, including tribal sheikhs who have great flexibility in dealing with whoever rules, regardless of their orientation, and similarly to the Salafists who – although they are more in conflict with the Houthis, they can – in cases of necessity – withdraw from public space and isolation in advocacy incubators and semi-closed education, and supporting this with religious teachings, stressing the avoidance of sedition, as is their situation today in Sana’a, Dhamar, Ibb, and other areas under the control of the Houthi group.
Despite the historical tensions and conflicts between Islah and the Houthi group, the brief history of their relationship reveals that Islah has demonstrated a willingness to initiate dialogue and understanding to avert destructive paths for both parties and the nation. The peak of their strained relations occurred when the Houthis seized control of Sanaa on September 21, 2014, taking over the headquarters of Islah and arresting several of its leaders and supporters. In response, Islah took the proactive step of sending a delegation to Saada to meet with Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi on December 27, 2014.
The delegation, comprised of Saeed Shamsan, head of the party’s political department, and Zaid Al-Shami, head of its parliamentary bloc, aimed to address the pressing national and moral responsibilities in the face of imminent dangers to Yemen. Both parties, as indicated in statements from Islah and the Houthi group, expressed a desire for cooperation and coexistence, emphasizing the need to move beyond past conflicts and work towards building the state. The meeting sought to implement the outcomes of the dialogue conference, the Comprehensive National Agreement, and the Peace and Partnership Agreement. The shared goal was to prevent Yemen from descending into the chaos and civil strife witnessed in Syria and Libya.5
Although that visit caused angry reactions within the party, to the point that Tawakkol Karman – who was a member of the party at the time – described the party members who attended the meeting with the Houthis as “slaves” of brute force, by which she meant the Houthis6… However, the party leadership announced that it was ready to hold a second meeting with the Houthis.
As surprising as this stance was for members of the party, it also caught political and media circles off guard7. This underscores that, despite the intricate dynamics between the Houthis and Islah, the latter exhibits a capacity for initiative and courage in surmounting challenges. This resilience is something that should be acknowledged and fostered by advocates of peace.
Considering all these factors, and additional ones to be discussed later, Islah stands out as the party most attuned to the nuances of both war and peace with the Houthis. It may also be the most adept at mobilization, extending its influence beyond its core base and supporters to a wider audience that shares commonalities in ideas, perceptions, and concerns. Even with its reservations taken into account, recognizing Islah’s role in building settlements and navigating a path toward peace becomes exceptionally significant.
A Complex of Fears
The Islah Party’s position on any political settlement with the Houthi group is determined by what we can call the “complex of fears,” which refers to caveats, concerns, impressions, expectations, and recalling experiences, including:
- Imposing a ruling system based on a narrow sectarian vision:
The Houthi group adopts a special vision of the ruling system, based on the theory of guardianship, which is the theory that limits the right to assume power to the Hashemite lineage (the male descendants of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib from his two sons, Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein). It is the same theory on which the rule of the Imams has been based since the year 284 AH and for intermittent periods in Yemeni history. This theory is considered one of the basic pillars on which Islam is based, according to the Hadavi-Zaidi doctrine.
The Houthi group requires its followers to work by all means – including fighting – so that the rule is limited to this category8. There is abundant evidence of the Houthi group’s efforts to impose this perception on the rest of society. Among them is mobilization in public discourse, what are known as educational courses and religious songs. This also includes changes in education curricula, obligations contained in the Code of Professional Conduct, and others. The narrow perception of governance adopted by the Houthis is one of the most important factors of anxiety and tension in their relationship with the rest of the political and social components, one of the main drivers of the war, and one of the main fears that could obstruct the path of settlement.9 - Discrimination between citizens:
In addition to the principle of guardianship, the Houthi group’s political perception of governance is based on the principle of selection, which means that God chose the descendants of Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib, from his two sons, Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein, and made rule their exclusive right, and granted them economic and social privileges that are not available to anyone else.
This principle is considered one of the main drivers of the conflict in Yemen, and one of the most important things that can hinder settlement and peace with the Houthis. It divides Yemeni society into a minority that rules based on their family affiliation, and a majority that is permanently ruled. It contradicts other Islamic perceptions of governance, modern forms of authority, and values. Equal citizenship, popular sovereignty, and the reference to the constitution guaranteeing rights and freedoms. All of this raises opposition and anger from a large segment of citizens, who see it as a racist perception10 that detracts from their humanity as well as their rights. That is why the Islahists, like the rest of the people, engage in opposing it.11
Difficulty in building a real partnership:
In light of the aforementioned considerations, a significant number of Islahists and, quite possibly, Yemenis harbor suspicions regarding the Houthi group’s true willingness to engage in genuine political partnerships. This skepticism seems to emanate from various sources, one being the historical backdrop of Zaidi Imams’ rule. This historical governance was characterized by restricting authority to the Hashemite families and limiting the involvement of other societal and geographical components to the bare minimum.
A second source of doubt arises from the Houthis’ ascendancy, which has resurrected and fueled this historical division. The third source of concern stems from observations that numerous appointments within the Houthi authority appear to favor individuals affiliated with the Hashemite families.
Islahists are apprehensive that the Houthis might be inclined towards establishing relationships based on annexation rather than a true partnership12. The previous political collaboration with the wings of the General People’s Congress party in Sana’a only served to reinforce this perception. Despite occurring in an imperfect context, it resulted in a nominal partnership structure, wherein the GPC party wing leaned more towards being a follower than a genuine partner. - Doubts about the Houthis’ commitment to the agreements:
The researcher observes a growing perception among a broad segment of Yemenis that the Houthis lack a genuine commitment to the agreements they enter into. While acknowledging that this issue may not be exclusive to the Houthi group, certain experiences seem to reinforce this belief. The historical pattern of their expansion since 2004 has been marked by a series of agreements followed by military expansion. Some attribute this to what they see as the Houthis’ failure to adhere to the “Peace and Partnership Agreement” and the “Outputs of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference.”13
Islah has faced discouraging experiences in its dealings with the Houthis14. Whether at the central or local level, Islah has been a party to understandings and agreements with the Houthi group, many of which have proven unsuccessful. Shortly after the agreement between Islah and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in Saada, mentioned earlier, Zaid al-Shami, the head of the parliamentary bloc of the Islah party, accused the Houthis of undermining the rapprochement. This was followed by the invasion of the Arhab district and the bombing of mosques, Quran centers, and the headquarters and homes of the Islah party. Al-Shami resigned from the negotiating team with the Houthis, expressing disappointment and apologizing to those who supported the rapprochement, stating that the events on the ground had dashed their hopes.15
Party leaders assert that this impression is echoed at the local level as well. According to Mahdi Al-Hatif, the Islah official in Hajjah, the Islah branch was party to agreements with the Houthis during battles in various areas, including Hajour. However, the Houthis did not honor these agreements. Instead, they engage in dialogue with tribal sheikhs and party leaders when faced with military setbacks, temporarily adhering to understandings until they can reorganize their military situation, after which they resume military offensives.16 - Existential risks:
The Houthi group’s control of power, in some dimensions, represented an existential threat to Islah, at least for the first ranks of its influential leaders and cadres. This resulted in a large displacement of them, either to safer areas or to migrate outside the country. It is expected that this issue will have an impact on the behavior of Islah – and also the conference – towards the political settlement with the Houthis, and these risks coincided with greater existential risks in the southern governorates, which went beyond the leadership of Islah to its ordinary members, and its supporters who belong to those governorates. In the context of these risks, we can understand the behavior of Islah in Taiz Governorate, its dealings with the Abu Al-Abbas group, the repeated battles that took place in Shabwa Governorate, and its unannounced movements in Hadhramaut. - Military imbalance:
The reformists and their local allies share the rationale behind their position on the possibility of a political settlement. These facts revolve around the imbalance of power and the experience of dealing with the Houthis. Due to the imbalance of power, the Houthis are likely to participate in any peace talks with the certainty of the victor and the strong, and a firm belief in the weakness of their opponents. Therefore, there are fears that they will be less willing to make concessions to make the talks successful and provide the sustainability factors for this political settlement17.
When the military balance tilts in favor of the Houthis, reformists have real fears that this settlement may be futile18, and may turn into a short period of respite followed by a new round of conflict19. Most of the Yemeni parties most likely share these concerns with the Islah leaders. - Linkage to the Iranian project:
Although there is no strong and convincing evidence about the Houthis’ dependence on Iran, a sector of reformists believes so, as they view the Houthis as part of the Iranian project that is struggling to impose its control over Yemen and the region. This belief is considered one of the… actors that may affect Islah’s position on the political settlement with the Houthis. This matter, it seems, is not limited to reformists, as it mostly reflects a popular trend. - Undermining reform gains:
Reformists view the Houthis – for the most part – as a zero-sum opponent, and that their presence will come at the expense of their intellectual orientation and the gains they have accumulated over the past decades. The experience of the period extending from 2014 supports this. The Houthis robbed the Islah Party’s headquarters, investments, and the homes of some of its leaders and supporters, and arrested and abused a number of its members. The educational incubators and supportive work environment in which the Islah Party had invested for decades were also bulldozed. - Concerns about the initiative without an umbrella:
The Secretary-General of the Islah Party, Abdul-Wahab Al-Ansi, stresses that Islah is a political party and that it will not negotiate with the Houthi group except with the rest of the national forces, and under the umbrella of the legitimate authority20. In analyzing this, some observers believe that Islah has concerns about taking the initiative toward the Houthis without this being under a national, regional, or international umbrella. This is due to its feeling of being targeted by internal parties, and more importantly by active regional and international powers.21 These fears restrict the Islah movement, and make it more committed to moving under the legitimate authority, the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, and international decisions and efforts at the international level.
Fears of moving without an umbrella for fear of being singled out and targeted are not unfounded concerns. Throughout the years of the war, Islah’s behavior towards the Houthis was the subject of monitoring, and the subject of multiple allegations as well. Media kitchens, most likely affiliated with parties in conflict with Islah, have organized to accuse it of coordinating, and perhaps serving, with the Houthis, in an attempt to antagonize the two countries’ coalition against it, and to pave the way for removing it from legitimacy to make it easier to target and abuse it.
Influencing the peace process:
The preceding discussion prompts us to address several key questions: Are the concerns voiced by the Islah party unique to them, or are they shared by a specific sector of the population? Are these concerns grounded in reality or are they merely perceived? Do they have an impact on the trajectory of peace, and can they be addressed?
It appears that a broad array of sectarian, intellectual, and historical considerations has expanded the circle of apprehension surrounding Houthi rule, centering on power and dominance. These considerations intertwine with people’s fears of the potential erosion of political, economic, and social gains achieved under Republican rule, along with the anticipated consequences on their lives. The Houthi administration’s policies, combined with internal and external parties withdrawing support, have contributed to consolidating and amplifying these concerns. In this context, the Islah party shares these apprehensions with a substantial segment of the population.
However, it is important to note that there are unique concerns specific to the Islah party. These stem from its perception that it stands to lose significantly compared to other parties, viewing the Houthi group as an alternative to its political project and a strategic threat to its gains, influence, and presence. The intellectual upbringing and political aspirations of Islah members intensify their sensitivity to these fears.
As for the validity of these concerns, some may be exaggerated, particularly those related to the Houthis’ absolute subordination to Iran and potential restrictions on religious rituals for dissenters. Nonetheless, the majority of these issues are tangible and have a palpable impact on the ground.
Examining the impact of these concerns on political settlement and peace, it becomes apparent that intellectual and military aspects are the most influential. The Houthis’ possession of a formidable military force poses a significant challenge, although potential solutions may exist. The fundamental challenge lies in the Houthi perception of governance, rooted in religious beliefs, particularly concerning the exclusive rule over Hashemite-affiliated families. While acknowledging the complexity of these situations, viable solutions are conceivable, as detailed in the forthcoming recommendations.
Recommendations for policymakers:
First: Special recommendations for addressing Islah’s concerns:
Facilitate an extensive exploratory dialogue involving leaders at various organizational levels and representing diverse intellectual perspectives from both factions, namely the Islahists and the Houthis. This dialogue should be facilitated by a local or international mediator trusted by both parties, conducted separately or in parallel to collective negotiations, and kept away from media scrutiny.
In the initial phase of this dialogue, prioritize the dispelling of mutual negative impressions. Focus on addressing straightforward issues, such as the Houthis relinquishing control over Islah’s headquarters, properties, and the residences of its leaders and members. Additionally, explore ways to mutually rationalize media discourse. Success in this early stage would pave the way for discussions on more intricate matters.
Ensure that the settlement files incorporate the concerns of the displaced and politically displaced individuals. Any resulting agreement should guarantee their safe return and the recovery of their property. This approach aims to align the interests of this crucial group with the broader settlement and peace-building process. Furthermore, the settlement agreement must provide assurances for their safety, guarding against any form of retaliatory harm.
Second: General recommendations for peace:
Encourage Yemeni parties to engage in significant concessions as a means of finding a resolution to the longstanding conflict between the state bloc and the larger opposing bloc. This may involve exploring the potential adoption of a parliamentary system, wherein the elected head of state commits to a limited term, not exceeding one term (four years). In this proposed structure, actual authority would rest with the Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers, formed through parliamentary elections.
Local and international mediators should inspire Yemeni parties to transform the dynamics between the Houthis and other Yemeni parties, including Islah. This transformation entails shifting from a zero-sum relationship, where one party gains at the expense of others, to a collaborative dynamic where mutual positive initiatives accumulate, breaking the cycle of existing violence.
While international mediators play a crucial role in the settlement and peace-building efforts in Yemen, their involvement should be limited to facilitation, applying pressure, and creating conducive conditions. The ultimate solution must be driven by Yemeni parties that hold influence on the ground, ensuring that the resolution is genuinely reflective of Yemen’s unique context and needs.
Resource:
Yemen’s overlapping wars, “Interview with Abdul-Ghani Al-Eryani,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, March 14, 2023, https://sanaacenter.org/ar/publications-all/analysis-ar/11995
For more, see Nasser Muhammad Ali Al-Taweel, “Transformations in the Southern Issue after the Arab Coalition’s Military Intervention in Yemen,” Arab Foundation for Strategic Studies, Istanbul, 2022.
Abdul Ghani Al-Iryani, Yemen Wars.
Member of the Supreme Commission for Reform and head of his parliamentary bloc, Abdul Razzaq Al-Hajri, personal interview with the researcher, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 7, 2023.
Member of the Supreme Commission for Reform, and head of his parliamentary bloc, Abdul Razzaq Al-Hajri, personal interview with the researcher, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 7, 2023 AD.
- Yemen: What does the Islah Party gain from dialogue with the Houthis? B B C Arab News, March 9, 2023: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/interactivity/2014/12/141202_comments_yemaen
- See: – Islah gambles by trying to get closer to the Houthis, Sada: Analysis of the Middle East, Carnegie Endowment, March 9, 2023:
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/58896
-Yemen: What does the Islah Party gain from dialogue with the Houthis? B B C – Arab News, painful, previously mentioned.
Secretary General of the Islah Party, Abdul Wahab Al-Ansi, personal interview with the researcher, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, March 13, 2023.
These ideas were mentioned in different forms in the responses of Hassan Mughalis, Adel Al-Shuja’, Askar Zu’il, Muhammad Qaizan, Shawqi Al-Qadi, Muhammad Nasser Al-Zarnouki, personal interview via Google Drive link, January 27, 2023.
Abdul Wahab Al-Ansi, personal interview with the researcher.
Head of the Executive Office for Reform in Hajjah Governorate, Mahdi Jaber Al-Hataf, personal interview with the researcher, Istanbul, Turkey, March 1, 2023.
Member of the General Secretariat of the General People’s Congress, Adel Al-Shuja’, personal interview via Google Drive link, January 27, 2023, and Mahdi Al-Hatif, personal interview with the researcher.
Adel Al-Shujaa, personal interview via Google Drive link.
Political activist Adel Al-Hassani, personal interview with the researcher, Istanbul, Turkey, March 16, 2023, and also: Mahdi Al-Hatif, and Salafist researcher Anwar Al-Khudari, personal interview with the researcher, Istanbul, Turkey, March 21, 2023.
- Islah leader Zaid al-Shami to those who objected to his meeting with Abdul-Malik al-Houthi: You were right and I apologize to you, Al-Masdar Online, March 9, 2023: https://almasdaronline.com/article/65404
- Mahdi Al-Hatif, personal interview with the researcher.
- Ahmed Al-Ahsab, personal interview via Google Drive link, January 27, 2023.
- Parliamentarian and member of Islah, Shawqi Al-Qadi, personal interview via Google Drive link, January 27, 2023.
- Abdul Wahab Al-Ansi, personal interview with the researcher.
- Abdul Wahab Al-Ansi, personal interview with the researcher.
- Adel Al-Hasani, personal interview with the researcher.